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Security of ”Counterfactual Quantum Cryptography”
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Key Laboratory of Quantum Information
University of Science and Technology of China
Hefei 230026
China
Recently, a ”counterfactual” quantum key distribution scheme was proposed by Tae-Gon Noh [1]. In this
scheme, two legitimate distant peers may share secret keys even when the information carriers are not traveled
in the quantum channel. We find that this protocol is equivalent to an entanglement distillation protocol (EDP).
According to this equivalence, a strict security proof and the asymptotic key bit rate are both obtained when
perfect single photon source is applied and Trojan-horse attack can be detected. We also find that the security
of this scheme is deeply related with not only the bit error rate but also the yields of photons. And our security
proof may shed light on security of other two-way protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [2–4] can enable two
distant peers (Alice and Bob) to share secret random string
of bits, called key. With QKD and one-time-pad, uncondi-
tional secure communication is possible. The most commonly
used QKD protocol is BB84, in which Alice encodes the state
of a single photon, transmits it to Bob through a quantum
channel which is accessed by a eavesdropper Eve, finally Bob
projects this photon into some states. Not only the BB84 pro-
tocol, nearly all of QKD protocols must transmit information
carriers (usually, a single photon) in a public quantum chan-
nel. Many successful experiments of QKD [5–11] have been
achieved during the past decade.
Quite interestingly, Tae-Gon Noh proposed a QKD proto-
col (N09) [1], in which the distribution of a secret key bit can
be accomplished even though a photon carrying secret infor-
mation is not in fact transmitted through the quantum channel.
Let us introduce the process of N09 protocol briefly.
In N09 protocol, Alice randomly encodes single photon
horizontal-polarized state |H〉 as bit 0 or vertical-polarized
state |V〉 as bit 1 and then inputs this photon to the port 2
of a beam-splitter (BS), whose the reflection and transmis-
sion modes are written as a and b respectively. For exam-
ple, if Alice emits |H〉, the quantum state of this photon will
be |ψH(V)〉 = (i|H(V)〉a|0〉b + |0〉a|H(V)〉b)/
√
2, in which we
consider a pi/2 phase is always added to reflection case and
there’s no phase change to transmission mode. The key point
is that mode a is kept by Alice, while mode b represents the
quantum channel between Alice and Bob. Thus, Eve can only
access the mode b, while mode a is unaffected by Eve. Bob
will choose to detect the |H〉b by his single photon detector
(SPD) D3 and just reflect other components of mode b as bit
0 or detect the |V〉b through D3 and just reflect other compo-
nents of mode b as bit 1. This operation can be viewed as a
random projection to |X〉b〈X|, which will be detected by the
detector D3 and 1 − |X〉b〈X|, in which X = H or X = V .
Bob’s operation can be implemented by optical switches and
polarization-beam-splitter (PBS). To detect the intrusion of
Eve, Alice and Bob may compare the initial polarization state
and the detected polarization state, if D3 clicks.
The mode b reflected by Bob will return to the Alice’s BS
and at the same time the mode a will also arrive at this BS
due to the reflection by a mirror owned by Alice. If the bit
choices of Alice and Bob are different, then the photon will
output from the port 2 of Alice’s BS and then hit Alice’s SPD
D2 due to the quantum interference. Conversely, if the bit
choices are the same, Bob will get a click in D3 with proba-
bility 1/2, which means the photon was at mode b. But, with
another probability of 1/2, the photon is at mode a and thus
Bob get no click in D3, Alice will get one click in D2 or D1
with equal chances. Therefore, a click from D1 means the gen-
eration of one bit secret key. The clicks of D1 can only step
from the photon at mode a not the quantum channel mode b.
Thus we say in N09 the task of distributing secret key bit can
be finished when the information carriers are not traveled in
quantum channel.
The security of N09 has not been proved though there are
some discussion on particular attacks. The security of this
protocol cannot be followed by the claim that Eve cannot ac-
cess the whole information carriers. Although some simple
attacks such as Eve detects the polarization of mode b, will
spoil the quantum interference and introduce bit error rate
of key bits. Eve may entangle her ancilla with the informa-
tion carrier and apply different operations to the go and return
mode b. Eve is able to get some bit keys without introducing
bit error. It’s totally different with BB84 protocol, which Eve
cannot launch an effective attack without introducing bit error
in ideal case. Thus a strict security proof is in urgent need for
N09 protocol.
In this paper, we put forward a security proof of N09 proto-
col when Trojan-horse-like attack [12] is prohibited. We find
that the security of N09 is highly related to not only the bit
error rate of key, but also the counting rates of D1 and D2.
Inspired by Ref[13], we propose a entanglement distillation
protocol (EDP) which is totally equivalent to the N09 proto-
col. Here, the meaning of this equivalence between the two
protocols is: to Alice and Bob, the generated secret key is
the same; to Eve, the available information is also the same.
The EDP is illustrated in Fig.1 and the detailed steps are as
follows:
(1). Alice prepares N pairs of entanglement states |Ψ〉A =
(|H〉A|ψH〉 + |V〉A|ψV〉)/
√
2, in which, the particle A and mode
a is protected in Alice’s security zone, while mode b is the
2FIG. 1: A and ψ represent Alice’s initial entangled particles; BS:
beam-splitter; Filter: quantum operation controlled by Alice or Bob,
which can project mode b into the Hilbert space spanned by |0〉, |H〉,
and |V〉. And a failure of this filtering operation results in the abortion
of the whole protocol; B1 and B represent Bob’s initial particles; PD:
polarization detector which detects particles with projectors |0〉〈0|,
|H〉〈H|, and |V〉〈V |.
quantum channel between Alice and Bob. Bob also prepares
N pairs of states |Ψ〉B = (|H〉B + |V〉B)|0〉B1/
√
2, in which,
the particles B and B1 are all ancilla owned by Bob, and Eve
has no chance to access them. Alice sends all of the modes b
of the N pairs of entanglement states and announces this fact
publicly.
(2). After passing through the quantum channel controlled
by Eve, the mode b of nth |Ψ〉A will enter Bob’s security
zone. Bob will first project the mode b with projectors
|0〉〈0| + |H〉〈H| + |V〉〈V |, and I − |0〉〈0| − |H〉〈H| − |V〉〈V |.
If Bob detects the mode b through the projective mea-
surement I − |0 >< 0| − |H >< H| − |V >< V |, he
will abort the protocol. This operation is carried out
by filter in Bob’ security zone as in Fig.1. If not, Bob
will apply an unitary transformation UBob to this mode b
and particle B and B1 of nth |Ψ〉B. UBob is defined as:
UBob|H〉B|0〉B1|0〉b = |H〉B|0〉B1|0〉b, UBob|H〉B|0〉B1|H〉b =
|H〉B|H〉B1|0〉b, UBob|H〉B|0〉B1|V〉b = |H〉B|0〉B1|V〉b,
UBob|V〉B1|0〉B1|0〉b = |V〉B|0〉B1|0〉b, UBob|V〉B1|0〉B1|H〉b =
|V〉B|0〉B1|H〉b, UBob|V〉B1|0〉B1|V〉b = |V〉B|V〉B1|0〉b. After this
transformation, Bob will detect the particle B1 with projectors
|0〉〈0|, |H〉〈H| and |V〉〈V | and record the result. After that, the
mode b will re-enter the quantum channel.
(3). After traveling along quantum channel controlled by
Eve, the nth mode b will re-enter Alice’s security zone. Be-
fore Alice combines this mode a and mode b of nth |Ψ〉A
in a BS at the same time, Alice must apply the same pro-
jection as to Bob’s projection in step (2) to detect any pos-
sible Trojan-horse attack. This is done by filter in Alice’s
security zone as in Fig.1. Consider the normal attenua-
tion of mode a is η, the effective state of mode a after this
BS is |H(V)〉a −→ √η(|H(V)〉1 + i|H(V)〉2). For mode b,
|H(V)〉b −→ (|iH(V)〉1 + |H(V)〉2)/
√
2.
(4). For each trial, Alice measures the mode 2 with the
following projectors: |0〉22〈0|, |H〉22〈H|, and |V〉22〈V |. This
operation corresponds to the PD in Fig.1. If a polarization
state H or V of mode 2 is observed by Alice, she will mea-
sure the polarization of corresponding particle A and the re-
sult is recorded by her. If Alice gets |0〉2 in her measurement,
Alice will detect if the polarization of mode 1 and the corre-
sponding particle A is the same. This operation can be done
by unitary transformation defined by UA|H(V)〉A|0〉1|a0〉 =
|H(V)〉A|0〉1|a0〉, UA |H(V)〉A|H〉1|a0〉 = |H(V)〉A|H〉1|a1(a2)〉,
UA|H(V)〉A|V〉1|a0〉 = |H(V)〉A|V〉1|a2(a1)〉, and |a0〉, |a1〉 and
|a2〉 are all quantum states of Alice’s ancilla and orthogonal
with each other. Now Alice detects the a with projectors
|a0〉〈a0|, |a1〉〈a1| and |a2〉〈a2|. If the output of Alice’s mea-
surement on a is |a1〉, Alice will preserve the corresponding
particle A, 1 for the following process. And these A and 1 are
called polarization consistent particles (PCPs).If Alice obtains
|a2〉, she measures the polarization state of corresponding par-
ticles 1 and A, which are called non-polarization-consistent
particles (NPCPs) for abbreviation, and records the results.
(5). After the transmission of N particles has completed,
Bob tells Alice the results of detection of each B1. Alice and
Bob disregard all the particles corresponding to non-vacuum
B1. Now, the following steps are only carried out for the cases
that B1 is in vacuum. Alice asks Bob to measure the polariza-
tion of particles B corresponding to NPCPs A. And then Alice
and Bob randomly select half of the PCPs A, 1 and its cor-
responding B, and measure them with the projectors |H〉〈H|
and |V〉〈V |. Hence, the probabilities Pr(XAYB0B1ZD), in which
X, Y, Z = H,V and D = 1, 2, are obtained by Alice and Bob.
(6). According to all of the probabilities observed in step
(5), Alice and Bob may carry out EDP for the other half of the
PCPs A, 1 and its corresponding B.
Since Eve cannot access Alice and Bob’s ancillas, this vir-
tual entanglement protocol is equivalent to N09 from Eve’s
view. To Alice and Bob, the key generated by the two pro-
tocols is totally the same. Therefore, the security analysis of
N09 protocol can be carried out on this EDP. On the other
hand, the EDP can be reduced to N09 with Shor and Preskill’s
method [13, 14].
The initial state of Alice is given by:
|Ψini〉⊗NA = (
1√
2
|0〉Aa|0〉b +
1
2
|H〉Aa|H〉b +
1
2
|V〉Aa|V〉b)⊗N
(1)
,in which, |0〉Aa = (i|H〉A|H〉a + i|V〉A|V〉a)/
√
2, |H〉Aa =
|H〉A|0〉a, and |V〉Aa = |V〉A|0〉a. We also define |0〉 = (1, 0, 0)T ,
|H〉 = (0, 1, 0)T , and |V〉 = (0, 0, 1)T .
We must point out only mode b can be input into Alice and
Bob, and the state of any modes b after Eve’s operation must
be in a Hilbert space spanned by |0〉, |H〉 and |V〉 since any
state out of the Hilbert space may be detected by Bob and Al-
ice’s projection 1 − |0〉〈0| − |H〉〈H| − |V〉〈V |, which results in
the abortion of the whole protocol. Above assumptions justify
the negligence of Trojan attack, which makes the security of
nearly all of ”go and return” QKD protocols to be inexplicit.
The most general attack is that: firstly, Eve may apply an uni-
tary transformation UEve to all the N b modes and her ancilla
e. Particularly, we consider the evolution of lth communica-
tion. This step can be described mathematically like this:
3UEve |Ψini〉⊗NA |e〉 =
∑
T (n,l)
(CT,T (l)=0|T, T (l) = 0〉AaUEve |T, T (l) = 0〉b|e0〉
+CT,T (l)=H |T, T (l) = H〉AaUEve |T, T (l) = H〉b|e0〉
+CT,T (l)=V |T, T (l) = V〉AaUEve |T, T (l) = V〉b|e0〉)
(2)
in which, T is a list like t1...tn...tN , tn = 0,H,V , and C is
constant. Consider any state |T = t1....tl...tN〉b|e0〉 must be
transformed to a superposition which consists of three classes:
tl = 0, tl = H or tl = V . In the next step Bob applies UBob to
the N b modes, B and B1. The result of Bob’s operation can
be re-written like this:
UBob[
1√
2
(HB + VB)]⊗NUEve |Ψini〉⊗NA |e0〉
=
1
2
0(l)Aa{Γ00(H(l)B + V (l)B )0(l)B10(l)b + Γ0H(H(l)B H(l)B10(l)b + V (l)B 0(l)B1H(l)b )
+ Γ0V (H(l)B 0(l)B1V (l)b + V (l)B V (l)B10(l)b )}
+
1
2
√
2
H(l)Aa{ΓH0(H(l)B + V (l)B )0(l)B10(l)b + ΓHH(H(l)B H(l)B10(l)b + V (l)B 0(l)B1H(l)b )
+ ΓHV (H(l)B 0(l)B1V (l)b + V (l)B V (l)B10(l)b )}
+
1
2
√
2
V (l)Aa{ΓV0(H(l)B + V (l)B )0(l)B10(l)b + ΓVH(H(l)B H(l)B10(l)b + V (l)B 0(l)B1H(l)b )
+ ΓVV (H(l)B 0(l)B1V (l)b + V (l)B V (l)B10(l)b )} (3)
, in which Γ represents the arbitrary state of all particles of
n , l and Eve’s ancilla.
Thirdly, another unitary transformation U ′Eve will be ap-
plied to all the modes b and Γ by Eve. We note that U ′Eve is
arbitrary, for example, U ′EveΓXYZ(l)b = ΓXYZ00
(l)
b +ΓXYZH H
(l)
b +
ΓXYZV V (l)b , in which X, Y, Z = 0,H,V . For simplicity, we con-
sider the Alice’s detectors and Bob’s detector never clicks
twice in one communication. This condition can be justified in
practical cases, due to the lower dark counts of SPD. Hence,
we obtain Γ0H = Γ0V = 0 and U ′EveΓ000(l)b = Γ00000
(l)
b . We
also define |K〉, K = 0, 1, 2... is a set of well-defined basis
for all Γ states, and CK(ABCD) = 〈K|ΓABCD〉, A, B,C,D =
0,H,V . According to above assumptions we may give the
density matrix for the lth particles A, B, B1, and modes a and
b in the following equation:
ρ
(l)
AB =
1
4
∑
K
P{0Aa[(HB + VB)0B1CK(0000)0b]
+
1√
2
HAa
∑
x
[(HB + VB)0B1CK(H00x)xb
+ HBHB1CK(HH0x)xb + VB0B1CK(HHHx)xb
+ HB0B1CK(HVVx)xb + VBVB1CK(HV0x)xb]
+
1√
2
VAa
∑
x
[(HB + VB)0B1CK(V00x)xb
+ HBHB1CK(VH0x)xb + VB0B1CK(VHHx)xb
+ HB0B1CK(VVVx)xb + VBVB1CK(VV0x)xb]}
(4)
Here, P{X} = |X〉〈X| and x in the summation notation
must be 0,H,V . Note that the unitary of Eve’s operation
and the assumption U ′EveΓ000(l)b = Γ00000
(l)
b must result in∑
K |CK(0000)|2 = 1.
Now, the effective operation done by Alice can be de-
scribed like H(V)a → √η(H(V)1+ iH(V)2)/
√
2 and H(V)b →
(iH(V)1 + H(V)2)/
√
2.
For simplicity, we define the α(l)K = CK(0000), β(l)K =
iCK(H00H)+ iCK(HVVH), γ(l)K = iCK(H00V)+ iCK(HVVV),
β
′(l)
K = iCK(V00V) + iCK(VHHV), γ′(l)K = iCK(V00H) +
iCK(VHHH), ξ(l)K = iCK(H00H) + iCK(HHHH), ζ(l)K =
iCK(H00V)+ iCK(HHHV), ξ′(l)K = iCK(V00V)+ iCK(VVVV),
and ζ′(l)K = iCK (V00H) + iCK(VVVH). If Bob gets |0〉B1 and
Alice gets |a1〉 in step (4) of the EDP, the sub-system of A, B
will be projected into:
ρ
′(l)
AB1
=
1
Λ(l)
∑
K
P{HAHB(√ηα(l)K + β(l)K ) + VAVB(
√
ηα
(l)
K + β
′(l)
K )
+ HAVB(√ηα(l)K + ξ(l)K ) + VAHB(
√
ηα
(l)
K + ξ
′(l)
K )} (5)
, where Λ(l) is normalization constance. Now, we can ana-
lyze the bit error rate and phase error rate of ρ′(l)AB1. Define
|φ+〉AB1 = (HAHBH1 + VAVBV1)/
√
2, |φ−〉AB1 = (HAHBH1 −
VAVBV1)/
√
2, |ψ+〉AB1 = (HAVBH1 + VAHBV1)/
√
2, and
|ψ−〉AB1 = (HAVBH1 − VAHBV1)/
√
2, we can deduce bit error
rate e(l)bit =AB1 〈ψ+|ρ
′(l)
AB1|ψ+〉AB1+AB1 〈ψ−|ρ
′(l)
AB1|ψ−〉AB1 and phase
error rate e(l)ph =AB1 〈φ−|ρ
′(l)
AB1|φ−〉AB1 +AB1 〈ψ−|ρ
′(l)
AB1|ψ−〉AB1.
With the expression of ρ(l)AB we can deduce the following
probabilities for the lth communication:
2Pr(l)(HAVB0B1H1) = 116
∑
K
| √ηα(l)K + ξ(l)K |2
Pr(l)(HAVB0B1H2) = 116
∑
K
| √ηα(l)K − ξ(l)K |2
2Pr(l)(VAHB0B1V1) = 116
∑
K
| √ηα(l)K + ξ′(l)K |2
Pr(l)(VAHB0B1V2) = 116
∑
K
| √ηα(l)K − ξ′(l)K |2
2Pr(l)(HAHB0B1H1) = 116
∑
K
| √ηα(l)K + β(l)K |2
Pr(l)(HAHB0B1H2) = 116
∑
K
| √ηα(l)K − β(l)K |2
2Pr(l)(VAVB0B1V1) = 116
∑
K
| √ηα(l)K + β′(l)K |2
Pr(l)(VAVB0B1V2) = 116
∑
K
| √ηα(l)K − β′(l)K |2
(6)
Recall that
∑
K |αK |2 = 1,
∑
K |
√
ηα
(l)
K + β
(l)
K |2/16 =
2Pr(l)(HAHB0B1H1), and ∑K | √ηα(l)K − β(l)K |2/16 =
4Pr(l)(HAHB0B1H2), we obtain β(l) = ∑K |β(l)K |2 =
8(2Pr(l)(HAHB0B1H1) + Pr(l)(HAHB0B1H2)) − η. By
the same way, we obtain β′(l) = ∑K |β′(l)K |2 =
8(2Pr(l)(VAVB0B1V1) + Pr(l)(VAVB0B1V2)) − η. Thanks
to Cauchy’s inequality, (
√∑
K |aK |2 −
√∑
K |bK |2)2 6∑
K |aK + bK |2 6 (
√∑
K |aK |2 +
√∑
K |bK |2)2 always
holds for arbitrary complex numbers aK and bK . Due to∑
K |ξ(l)K − ξ′(l)K |2 =
∑
K |
√
ηα
(l)
K + ξ
(l)
K −
√
ηα
(l)
K − ξ′(l)K |2/4,
we obtain the upper bound of ∑K |ξ(l)K − ξ′(l)K |2 is
ξ(l) = 8(
√
Pr(l)(HAVB0B1H1) +
√
Pr(l)(VAHB0B1V1))2.
With these parameters, e(l)ph can be given by:
e
(l)
ph =
1
2Λ(l)
∑
K
(|β(l)K − β′(l)K |2 + |ξ(l)K − ξ′(l)k |2)
6
1
2Λ(l)
((
√
β(l) +
√
β′(l))2 + ξ(l))
(7)
Though e(l)ph has been given, we cannot give the overall eph
since e(l)ph may be arbitrary correlated with previous l−1 events.
Thanks to Azuma’s inequality [15, 16], for sufficient large N
pairs of A, B and 1, differs between eph and
∑N
l=1 e
(l)
ph/N are
arbitrary small. Therefore, we obtain the overall phase error
rate eph =
∑N
l=1 e
(l)
ph/N.
Also according to Azuma’s inequality, we have β ,∑N
l=1 β
(l)/N = 8(2Pr(HAHB0B1H1)+Pr(HAHB0B1H2))−η, β′ ,∑N
l=1 β
′(l)/N = 8(2Pr(VAHB0B1V1)+Pr(VAHB0B1V2))−η, and∑N
l=1 ξ
(l)/N 6 8(√Pr(HAVB0B1H1) +
√
Pr(VAHB0B1V1))2 , ξ
always hold when N is sufficient large. Recall ∑K |α(l)K |2 = 1,
we obtain
Λ(l) =
∑
K
(| √ηα(l)K + β(l)K |2 + |
√
ηα
(l)
K + β
′(l)
K |2
+ | √ηα(l)K + ξ(l)K |2 + |
√
ηα
(l)
K + ξ
′(l)
K |2)
> (√η −
√
β(l))2 + (√η −
√
β′(l))2
(8)
Therefore, the overall phase error rate can be bounded through
the following inequality:
eph =
N∑
l=1
e
(l)
ph/N
6
1
N
N∑
l=1
min{ (
√
β(l) +
√
β′(l))2 + ξ(l)
2((√η −
√
β(l))2 + (√η −
√
β′(l))2)
, 1}
6
1
N
N∑
l=1
[min{ β
(l)
(√η −
√
β(l))2
, 1} + min{ β
′(l)
(√η −
√
β′(l))2
, 1}
+ min{ ξ
(l)
4(√η −
√
β(l))2
, 1} + min{ ξ
(l)
4(√η −
√
β′(l))2
, 1}]
(9)
, in which min{x, y} equals to the smaller one of x and y.
Now the final problem is how to calculate the upper bound
of eph with constraints β =
∑N
l=1 β
(l)/N, β′ =
∑N
l=1 β
′(l)/N and
ξ =
∑N
l=1 ξ
(l)/N. Note that min{x/(√η − √x)2, 1} is a noncon-
vex function about x (x = β(l), β′(l)). And it’s easy to verify
that
∑N
l=1 min{ξ(l)/4(
√
η −
√
β(l))2, 1} will be maximized when
all the denominators are equal. Hence, we can obtain the fol-
lowing upper bound of eph:
eph 6
4β + 4β′
η
+
ξ
4(√η − √β)2 +
ξ
4(√η − √β′)2 (10)
In fact, if there isn’t Eve’s attack, and no channel noises,
Alice and Bob must find 2Pr(HAHB0B1H1) = η/16 and
Pr(HAHB0B1H2) = η/16, thus β = 0. With the same way
we obtain β′ = 0, ξ = 0. Thus pure maximal entanglement
states (HAHBH1 + VAVBV1)/
√
2 can be shared between Alice
and Bob. Due to the equivalence of the N09 and EDP, we con-
clude that N09 is unconditional secure in the noiseless case.
We must point out that the unconditional security is under the
assumption that Eve cannot control the transmission efficiency
of Alice’s mode a and quantum efficiency of Alice and Bob’s
SPDs. This is different with BB84, which is secure even if the
efficiency of detectors are controlled by Eve.
We also consider a typical noise channel case, in which
the visibility is V and polarization flip probability when pho-
ton flying in quantum channel is p. Then we maybe ob-
tain Pr(HAHB0B1H1) = η/32, Pr(HAHB0B1H2) = η/16,
Pr(HAVB0B1H1) = (1−V)(1− p)η/16, and Pr(VAHB0B1V1) =
(1 − V)(1 − p)η/16, from which we can deduce the ebit =
2(1−V)(1− p)/(1+2(1−V)(1− p)) and eph = (1−V)(1− p)/2.
For example, let V = 0.98, p = 0, we find ebit = 3.85% while
eph = 1%. It’s interesting that eph may be smaller than ebit.
In this paper, we have proved the unconditional security of
N09 protocol by considering its equivalence to a EDP process.
According to Ref. [17], our security proof is also composable.
Through estimating the upper bound of the eph, we obtain the
key bit rate. We find the security of N09 protocol relies not
only the bit error rate but also some counting rates of SPDs.
We must point out that our security analysis is in an ideal sit-
uation, in which we assume that perfect single photon source
is applied, Alice and Bob can detect any type of Trojan-horse
attacks, the mode a’s evolution is perfect and the efficiencies
of SPDs are all constant. We believe that our security analysis
has given a solid foundation for real-life N09. The possible
lower phase error rate than bit error rate may be an advantage
of N09 protocol.
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